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Defendants' Brief
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to determine the validity of the actions taken by the Salt Lake
County Commission, to date, to create a sewer district
and acquire a sewer system.
1
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rrhe Statement of Facts by the petitioners is not
acceptable. Petitioners confuse the issues by reciting
things which they fear might be done, rather than confining themselves to the things which the County Commission has in fact done. They becloud the issues before
the court by detailed discussions that do not relate to
the legality of the actions taken. Therefore, the following
additional statement is necessary to a clear presentation
of the County's position.
At the outset, let it be noted that the County Commissioners are the duly elected representatives of the
people. Certain powers and duties are conferred and
imposed on them by law. There is no presumption that
they are proceeding in violation of their duties and not
every decision they make is subject to review by the
courts. The validity of the statutes and proceedings
under those statutes present the issues for determination.
Matters of judgment placed by law in the Commission
are not here material and a detailed discussion of such
such matters only beclouds the issues.
The first ordinance mentioned by petitioners is an
ordinance adopted on May 18, 1942, prohibiting the use
of privies, cesspools, etc., in areas where a sewer system
is available. This ordinance was not adopted under the
statutes in question, nor is it a pBrt of ::~nv of t.hP. sewer
2
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proceedings. It preceded the first step in t Jw formation
of a sPwer distriet by nearly fi,·l~ ypn rs. \Vh i lP WP
included this 1942 ordinance in the record nt petitioners'
insistence, and they have discussed it in some detail,
we do not believe that it has anything to do with thP
issues here involved.
The first action of the County Commission relating
to the creation of a sewer district was taken on September 9, 1946. On that date a resolution and order
creating a district under Chapter 6(a) Title 19, were
adopted. (See exhibits B and C.) Petitioners question
the constitutionality of that statute, but there is apparently no challenge made by petitioners concerning the
sufficiency of the steps taken under the statute to create
a district. No such an attack could be made successfully.
The order and resolution show that the required signatures were obtained and the required proceedings were
followed, and the Legislature thereafter expressly validated all of the proceedings and any irregularities, if
any there were, were cured by this validation act. (See
Chapter 23b, Laws of Utah, 1947.)
The next action was taken on March 18, 1947. On
that date three separate resolutions were adopted by
the Commission. These three resolutions are bound together in the court files as Exhibit U. The first resolution
adopted March 18, 1947, recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the district had been created under Title 19, Chapter
6 (a) on September 9, 1946, and that the commission de·3
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sired to ratify the creation of that district and to fix its
boundaries with more certainty.
Petitioners erroneously refer to the resolutions of
March 18th as "formally" creating the district. (Page 4,
petitioners' brief) Petitioners then note that on April 5,
1948, the County Commission rescinded ''the'' resolution of March 18, 1947, (page 8, petitioners' brief) leaving the erroneous impression that the orders and resolutions creating the district were rescinded. We think it is
important that the court bear in mind that only one of
the three resolutions adopted on March 18, 1947, was
rescinded. The other two (including the one ratifying
the creation of the district) have never been questioned,
and no attempt has ever been made to repeal or rescind
them.
Since neither this nor the proceedings of September
9, 1946, were ever repealed or rescinded, the district has
been valid and subsisting at all times since September 9,
1946. The assertion by the petitioners that there was no
district in existence at the time some of the subsequent
contracts were entered into and other proceedings were
taken is simply not correct.
On page 5 of Exhibit U is the second ordinance of
March 18, 1947, which in effect amended the 1942 sewer
ordinance relating to the use of privies and cesspools
where a sanitary sewer S-ystem was available. Then on
page 8 of Exhibit U is the third resolution providing for
the acquisition of a sewer system, and the issuance and
sale of the bonds. Thereafter by t:h~nt~:~-r ?.~fh' Ll=lw~

4
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of Utah, 1947, the leg-islature validated a,ll of the proceeding-s theretofore taken. This validation act waH
passed March 13, 1947, approved March 19, 1947, and
became effective :May 13, 1947.
A contract to sell the bonds for 31,4 per cent interest
was entered into. (Ex. D) Engineers were employed.
(Ex. E) Procedures were set up for the receiving of
down payments on the system. (Ex. F) A trustee was
selected and a citizens' advisory committee appointed.
(Ex. G) The bonds were prepared for final printing,
(Ex. K) and construction bids were received. (Ex. L)
Signed applications for service were taken from 1510
persons and approximately $85,000.00 was collected by
way of down payments. (Ex. Land V, page 3)
On April 5, 1948, the County Commission determined
that it should reject all of the construction bids, because
excessive, elected not to issue the bonds, and provided
for the return of the approximately $85,000.00 to the
applicants. The resolution adopted April5, 1948, (Ex. L)
in express words rescinded the third resolution adopted
by the Commission on March 18, 1947. The action of the
Commission to create the district, as taken on September
9, 1946, and confirmed March 18, 1947, and validated by
the legislature, was left undisturbed.
On page 52 of petitioners' brief, they reiterate that
the sewer district was abandoned. They admit on page
52 that no attempt has ever been made to dissolve the
district. Still much of the brief is devoted to the asser-

5
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l
tion that since the County Commission determined on
April 5, 1948, that it would not proceed with construction and authorized the return of the monies collected,
the district in some manner died, and the County Commission lost all power ever to do anything further in the
premises. Whether intentionally or not, petitioners carefully avoid a discussion, either in the Facts or in the
Argument, as to how the district ''died'' or ceased to
exist. There has never been any resolution adopted or
other action taken by the County Commission to dissolve or abandon the district. All that was abandoned
was the construction program of 1947 on which bids had
been received and down payments had been accepted.
When the Commission decided that it would not proceed
with construction, it became necessary to permit the return of the down payment to the applicants. This was
done, but the district was not dissolved and it remained
to this day as a valid, subsisting district with the Board
of County Commissioners its governing authority.

I
I

Thus, in the spring of 1952, the district had full
power to enter into any contracts germane to the acquisition of a sewer, and had the power to present to the
people a further project. This was done. A proposed
plan was prepared and engineering was completed.
Twenty thousand informational pamphlets were distributed. Twenty-eight mass meetings were held. A letter was
mailed to every property owner within the district and
paid advertisements were placed in all the Salt Lake
newspapers. Nearly all of the people were heard from,
either in the form of protests or apnlil'Ht-ion~ A~ 1~ ~Pt
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forth in the answer of the County, in paragraph 12, there
were less than 8700 existing structures in the district in
the spring of 1952. Applications for service were received
without protest from 6424 owners of these existing structures. An additional petition, containing 2645 signatures,
(but not representing 2645 homes) was received and an
additional 1210 applications were received for service
to vacant lits. It will be noted from the reply of the
plaintiffs that these allegations are admitted.
1

One of the main criticisms which was made of the
19±7 project was that it was "cut and dried" before the
people were told about it. The bonds had already been
sold. The engineers had been employed, and the bond
resolution had been adopted, before the project was
presented to the people. It was the County's desire to
present this project to the people in full before adopting
a final bond resolution. Because no final resolution had
been adopted when the Commission presented its tentative plan to the people and solicited applications, petitioners say everything was illegal. They completely
ignore the fact that the district itself still existed. With
this district the Commission employed an engineer, fiscal
agents and arranged for a depository. (Ex. 0, P, and Q)
1 1t must also be borne in mind that while many of the 6424 application cards were signed both by husband and wife, they were counted
as a single application, because they were for service to a single
structure. About 300 were for duplexes and apartments. These also
were counted only as one. The 2600 protest signatures were just that
and did not reflect 2600 structures. This is pointed up by the
fact that the 6424 unprotested applications, the 390 protested applications, and the 2645 signature pr<?tests ~ot~l 9459. There . we!e only
8603 existing structures of all kmds withm the . sev:er district. :ro
this 9459 total must also be added the 1210 applications for service
to vacant lots.

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The district then presented to the people a detailed plan
for the acquisition of a sewer. The people made various
suggestions and objections. These were met (Ex. S) and
then the people overwhelmingly (more than 75 per cent
of the total) endorsed it in the form of signed applications for service. We seriously challenge the bald assertion of petitioners in the Statement of Facts that they
represent "thousands of people" in the county.
The only other fact situation presented by the petitioners on which we desire to comment is the manner of
signing for service. Petitioners assert that because of
the ordinance making it a misdemeanor to use a cesspool,
privy or septic tank where a sewer was available, all
persons were coerced into signing up, and that the only
manner in which they could sign up was to either give
a lien on their property, or prepay eighteen months
service. This is incorrect.

·j

Insofar as signing up for service was concerned,
there were five methods available to any individual. First,
the individual could pay his share in cash at the time he
applied for service. Second, he could agree to pay his
share in 24 equal monthly installments. Third, he could
start out on a regular time basis and at any time within
two years change his mind and pay off in full. Fourth,
he could pay $50.00 down and $10.00 a month until he
had paid $150.00. Thereafter, he would pay the monthly
service charge of $3.00 per month until the project was
paid for. If he used this time method of payment he
could either, (a) agree that his unp81rl h~ll ;-~? ..:J~l!~~n""'+

8
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more than six months, could bl' recorded as n lien ag-n inst
his property, or (b) he could pn'pay eighteen months
serTiCl" and did not have to agTl'C' to the lien. ( SPt> eontract forms attached to County's answer.) l-Ie thus had
four different methods by which he could apply for service without the lien provision. An arrangement was
also worked out with the Department of Public Welfare,
to pay not only the down payment, but the monthly service charge for any relief cases.
There is throughout petitioners' statement of facts
and throughout petitioners' brief an attempt to leave the
impression with the court that the Commission ran
"rough-shod" oYer the wishes of the people and by a
criminal ordinance coerced them into giving a lien on
their property. The County fully presented its proposed
plan to the people and listened to their suggestions and
made changes to meet those suggestions and objections.
(Ex. S) It heard from practically all of the people in
the district. Five different methods of applying for
service were available, only one of which called for a
lien. Over 75 per cent of the people applied for service
without protest. It obviously was easier to induce a
person to make a protest which carried with it no responsibilities, obligations or liabilities than to induce
the signing of an application with all of its obligations.
The County Commission was extremely solicitous of the
people's wishes. The argument to follow will demonstrate that its actions were entirely legal.

9
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ARGUMENT
We will treat the points raised substantially in the
order that they are developed in the brief of the petitioners.

-•
;g

POINT I. THERE IS STATUTORY AUTHORITY
FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY COMMISSION IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALT
LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY DISTRICT.
(a) Regardless of what construction is placed on
Chapter 6(a) Title 19, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, the validation act of 1947 confirms the
Commission's power to issue revenue bonds.
Before joining issue with the petitioners on their
specific discussion of Chapter 6(a), we desire to direct
the court's attention to Chapter 23(b), Laws of Utah,
1947. By this chapter the legislature expressly recognized and confirmed the power of the County Commission
to issue revenue bonds under Chapter 6(a), Title 19,
Utah Code Anno. 1943. Thus, while defendants are confident that they did not exceed the authority of the
statute under which they proceeded in providing for
issuance of revenue bonds, they need not rely on that
authority. Chapter 23(b ), Laws of Utah, 1947, is all the
statutory authority required for their actions prior to
May 13, 1947. It expressly validated all proceedings, including the creation of the district_
10
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The validating act expressly said that the action of
any County purporting to creah~ a sl~wer distriet and
providing for the issnnnee of revenue bonds under
Chapter 6( a) for the acquisition of sewer facilities, "are
hereby validated, ratified and confirmed.'' The validation, ratification and confirmation was to take effect
"despite any irregularities which may have occurred
and despite any failure to observe any pertinent statutory requirement as to the filing of petitions, or otherwise." It further said that the Commission was authorized to proceed with the issuance of bonds thereunder, etc.
This statute clearly validates every procedure taken
by any board of county commissioners purporting to act
under the authority of Chapter 6(a). The validation act
is more than a legislative opinion that procedures under
consideration were within a previous grant of power;
it is in itself a retroactive grant of power if any is
needed. A validation act supplies the authority for the
procedures validated, even if such authority had previously been totally absent. The only limitations on the
curative power of the Legislature are constitutional
limitations which did not here exist.
Plaintiff does not deny the complete curative effect
of a validation act and the cases in great number support
us in this regard. The general rule is stated in "McQuillan, Third Edition,'' Section 4.15 as follows :
"The general rule is that a legislature may validate an action of a municipal corporation if the
legislature had power to authorize it in the first
instance. It may cure the failure to comply with
11
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statutory requirements which might have originally been dispensed with in the proceedings of
municipal corporations."
The rule has been expressly affirmed in Utah. See
Daggett v. Lynch, 18 Utah 45, 54 P. 1095. In that case,
Daggett County created indebtedness under certain warrants which were void because in excess of the County's
statutory debt limit. The legislature possessed the
power at that time to raise the debt limit of a County.
After the warrants were issued, the legislature validated
the warrants. The court held that the validating act
authorizing the issuance of warrants was effective to
render the warrants valid, even though at the time the
warrants were issued they were void, because in excess
of the debt limit of the county. In so holding, the court
said:
"The legislature possessed the power, when the
warrant was issued, to raise the debt limit, and
the warrant having been issued in excess of that
limit, the legislature might validate it. An act of
a county void for want of authority may be validated by the legislature if it had the power before
the void act was done to authorize it."
In June of this year the Tennessee Supreme Court
considered a curative act, subject to every attack now
being made against Chapter 23(b), Laws of Utah, 1947,
and more. The county had levied an ad valorem tax for
general county purposes in excess of the maximum allowed by general law. The legislature then validated the
excess, and stated the purposes for which the excess must
be used. The court held the validating act constitutional.

12
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It was also held that the nrt did not violate a provision
prohibiting the suspension of general law for particular
individuals. The court thus upheld, pyon in an ad valorem
tax rase, the propriety of retroactive ratifiration of an
entire}~~ ultra Yires leYy. See Cinn. N. 0. & T. 0. R.R. v.
Rea Company. ~50 S.\Y. (~d) 60.
See also, in re ChrZ:stensen's Estate, (Utah), 54 P.
1095, Hodges r. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 61 L. Ed. 819, and
the numerous authorities cited in ''McQuillan, Third Edition,'' Section 4.15 in support of this rule.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that even if
Chapter 6(a), as enacted in 1933, did not grant to the
counties any power to borrow money and pledge revenues
• and issue bonds, the \alidation act of 1947 had the legal
effect of a retroactive grant of power to the County Commission. The legislature clearly had the power to provide for revenue bonds, etc., in the first instance, (Tygeson v. 1Wagna Water District, Utah, 226 P. 2d 157). The
validation act leaves the creation of the district and the
proceedings and the powers of the County Commission
to borrow money and issue bonds unchallengeable. This
is a complete answer to Point I of petitioners' brief,
including the argument on implied repeal.
We believe that even without this legislative ratification, Chapter 6(a) gave adequate power to the Commission. We, accordingly, in the sections to follow, join
issue with the petitioners' construction of the statutes.
We do so, however, with the assertion that this issue in13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sofar as it relates to actions prior to May 13, 1947, is
moot, because the validation act is itself an adequate
grant of power.
(b) Chapter 6(a) Title 19 confers all of the necessary powers.
As said by our court in Washington County v. Tax
Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 P. 2d 564:
'' 'But a statute is passed as a whole, not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every
part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole'. Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction,
Second Edition, Volume 2, page 706.''
Article VI Section 23 of the Constitution provides
that the subject of a statute "shall be clearly expressed
in its title.'' The purpose may be expressed in general
terms and the purpose thus expressed is the "subject"
of the act. In re Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 P. 810. The title
is thus important in determining the purpose of the act.
The title as the act was originally introduced on Febru·
ary 13, 1933, House Journal page 365, provided as follows:
''An act authorizing boards of county commissioners to create flood control districts ... and to
create special improvement, water supply, sewer
or sanitary district . . . and to provide for the
cost of the acquisition and installation of such
improvements . . . to be paid from assessments
levied against the property within said district,
benefited by such improvement or by fees, tolls,
14
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rents, or other charges for the use of such improvements, or both.''
At the time the bill was thus entitled, it did not
contain what is now Section 8 at all. Thereafter Section
8 was added and the title to the bill was amended by
adding at the end thereof the following :
"And authorizing boards of county commissioners
to borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or other agency where appropriate, according to law, the necessary funds and to secure
and repay the same.''
This title did not restrict borrowing to federal projects.
It expressly says that the act authorizes the district to
borrow from the R.F .C. or other agencies.
Since, as petitioners point out, Section 8 of the Chapter did not appear at all in the bill as originally introduced, their construction would ascribe to the architects of the
original bill a complete lack of legislative conception and
a total lack of legislative purpose. If the only grant of
power to borrow money were in Section 8, then the original bill, which lacked Section 8, in effect had no practical
purpose. Districts when created have no current funds
and it is nonsensical to assume a plan where laborers and
materialmen wait for payment until a system is completed
and tolls return the costs. Nor is it sensible to assume
that special assessments could be payable by everyone
on an expensive sewer project in one payment at the beginning of construction. To "provide" for a sewer,
financing over a period of time was and is essential. The
act must be given a sensible construction which will ac-

15
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<·omplish the purposes sought by the statute. Tax Comm.
vs. Logan, 88 Ut. 406, 54 Fed. 1197.
We submit that before Section 8 was added, a grant
of power adequate to the purposes of the act certainly
was intended by the framers. When Section 8 was added
'
it was not intended to negate the powers previously conferred. It was rather to supplement than to supersede
the powers already granted. Neither the title of the bill
nor the express wording of Section 8 would require a
construction which would limit the borrowing of money
to federal projects. Even if Section 8 were to be so
construed, Section 1 of the act was itself broad enough to
permit it.
Section 8 expressly authorizes the borrowing from
either public or private agencies, persons, corporations,
or individuals. The construction placed upon this language by petitioners is far-fetched indeed. The section
starts out by referring to county commissions "creating
special improvements as hereinabove described.'' The
"hereinabove described" can only refer to Section 1. Section 8 then goes on to say that such county commissions
are authorized to create and operate such projects and
improvements as may be appropriate and possible under
the laws of the United States. The language contemplates the creation and operation of projects as authorized "hereinabove" under Section 1, and projects operated under appropriate laws of the United States. It
then goes on ''and in connection therewith'' the County
may enter into contracts with the United States or other
private or public agency, person, corporation or indi16
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Yidual for borrowing money, issuing bonds, etc. This
language clearly refers to both types of project. That
is, those created" as hereinabove described" and projects
created under appropriate laws of the United States. It
does not matter what motivated the legislature to adopt
Section 8, so long as the language which it adopted expressly permits borrowing from private agencies. The
section as adopted expressly permitted borrowing from
private sources. The amendment to the title of the act
which was made when Section 8 was added declares its
purpose to be to permit boards to borrow money from
the R.F.C., or other agencies. If the language of Section 8 is to be construed as narrowly as petitioners request, there would be a serious doubt as to whether the
description of the purpose contained in the title was not
defeated by Section 8 as so construed. The title clearly
says that its purpose is to permit the borrowing of money
from the R.F.C. or other agency. Section 8 says that
county commissions creating projects as "hereinabove
described'' (Section 1) may also create projects under
appropriate laws of the United States, and in connection
"therewith" (referring to both types of projects) the
commission may borrow money from public or private
sources. Such a construction meets with common sense
and is in harmony with the purpose expressed in the
title. It permits county commissions to carry into effect
the objectives of the act, while the construction urged
by the petitioners would render the act useless.
In view of the grants of power in Section 1 and the
supplemental express grant of power in Section 8, there

17
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<·.au be little doubt that the County Commission had the

power 1o borrow money. The granting of express power
to enter into contracts with the United States is not new
to Utah legislative procedure. Almost all of the water
bills adopted by our Utah Legislature have so provided.
(See, for example, the Utah Water and Power Board
Act, Laws of Utah, 1947, Ch. 141, Section 4, Subdivision
8; the Water Conservancy Act, Section 100-11-14(e);
the Local Improvement District Acts, Law~ of Utah,
1951, Chapter 32, Section 11.)
But even if we were wrong as to the construction of
both Sections 1 and 8, nevertheless, the legislative validation in 1947 was itself an express and direct grant of
power to borrow from a private agency, to issue bonds
and pledge revenues for repayment.
(c) The Practical Construction given Chapter 6(a),
Title 19, Utah Code Anno. 1943, by the County
Commission is reasonable, and· even if another
were possible is entitled to judicial respect.
The Board of County Commissioners has construed
Chapter 6(a) as a grant of power to finance a sewer
project with private agencies by a revenue bond issue.
The reasonableness of that construction, we believe, we
have already made clear. The board's construction in
1947 and again in 1952 being reasonable, is entitled to
judicial respect. See Utah Power & Light Comparny v.
Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P. 2d. 542,
where the court said at page 187:
''Consistent administrative interpretation over
the years by the officers charged with the duty of
18
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applying the statute and making ea<'h part work
efficiently and smoothly are entitled to great
weight by the courts.·'
See also Section 78. 4~ ...m. Jr. 392 in note 20, with some
fifty cases supporting the statement that: ''The practical
interpretation of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by
the executiYe department charged with its administration
or enforcement is entitled to the highest respect from
the courts.''
(d) When a Legislature readopts a Statute without
change after notorious construction by officers
charged with administering it, the presumptlon
is that the Legislature knew of the construction
and adopted it.
Closely related to the principle discussed under subdivision (c) hereof is the principle of law that when the
legislature ''readopts a statutory act without change
after uniform and notorious construction by officers required to administer it, the presumption is that the
legislature knew of such construction and adopted it in
re-enacting the statute.'' Utah Power & Light Company
v. Public service Commission, supra. We do not here
have a legislative readoption of the statute, but there is
through the validation act an express recognition by the
legislature of the construction placed upon this statute
by the County Commission. The statute recognizes expressly that county commissions had construed this
statute to permit them to borrow money on revenue bond
issues from private sources. Knowing that the county
commissions had so construed it, the legislature ratified

19
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this construction. We believe that this legislative recognition of the prior construction by the county commission
is entitled to weight by the court in construing the
statute, although we recognize that the principle of readoption of a statute is probebly not directly involved as
such.
POINT II. CHAPTER 6 (a) TITLE 19 HAS NEVER
BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION OR
OTHERWISE.
Repeals by implication will not be upheld from the
single fact that acts passed at different times deal with
the same subject matter, in whole or in part. The focal
point of the inquiry is the intent of the legislature in the
enactment of the alleged repealing act. (See 50 Am. Jur.
541, section 535) In determining that intent, there are a
number of principles universally accepted, which are
most helpful.
The paramount principle is that repeals by implication are not favored. This is a maxim announced by
every court in the land. Early statements by the Utah
Court are found in University of Utah v. Richards, 20
Utah 457, and Neldon v. Clark, 20 Utah 382. Even in the
rare instances when the court has declared an implied
repeal, it has expressed its deep antipathy toward such
declarations. In Western Beverage v. Hansen, 96 P. 2d.
1105 (Utah 1939), the court said:
''Differences of time will be disregarded in construing a code if, by disregarding them and looking at the work as a whole, harmony can thereby
20
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be produced, but if this provP~ in1possible, and if,
after e.rha,usfinp ercry scheme of rennwiliatim1,
there still remains a palpable and irn·sj)'J'l'Ssibll·
conflict, the Supreme Court i~ eompl'llt'd in the
absence of anything el~P indicatiYt' of ll'gi~lative
will, to determine the legislativP will by adopting
the lah'st declaration of the legislature.''
As noted in the quotation above set forth, there must be
an "irrepressible" and "palpable'' conflict. The mere
fact that two acts co-exist on the same subject matter
has never been held to be enough unless this irrepressible
conflict exists. Not one single instance of conflict IS
pointed out by the petitioners and in fact none exists.
Further, the legislature here has affirmatively indicated that it did not intend to impliedly repeal Chapter
6(a). To begin with, the act which petitioners contend
is an implied repeal of Chapter 6(a), was approved by
the same legislature that adopted the validation act. The
act relied upon by petitioners for the implied repeal is
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947. The very same legislature passed the validating act on the very same day.
See Chapter 23(b ), Laws of Utah, 1947. Both acts were
passed March 13, 1947. The so-called repealing act was
approved :l\Iarch 17th and the validating act was approved March 19th. There is thus something in addition
to the words of the statutes clearly indicative of legislative intent not to repeal. When enactments, allegedly
in conflict, were enacted on the same day, the presumption against implied repeal is particularly strong. Graham v. Goodell, 282 U.S. 409. The same is true where the
statute alleged to have been repealed is an important
21
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law of long standing. .Attorney General v. Joyce, 233
i\lieh. 619, 207 N.W. 863.
rrhere is another rule which helps govern the courts
in determining whether or not there has been an implied
repeal. A statute in order to be held to constitute an
implied repeal of an older statute must cover the entire
scope of the act repealed so that the former may be intended as a substitute. Where the old statute contains
subject matters not covered by the later statute, an
implied repeal will not be assumed, because it leaves
those other fields then without legislation. Thus, in re
Goddard, 74 P. 2d 818, the court said that:
"for a law to repeal or supercede an earlier statute, the later law must constitute a revision of
the entire subject, so that the court may say it
was intended as a substitute.''
In Tombstone v. Macia, 245 Pac. 677, 46 A.L.R. 828,
it was held that a statute permitting the issuance of
municipal bonds for any lawful and necessary purpose
was not repealed by the re-enactment of a prior statute
authorizing the issuance of bonds for any purpose for
which the municipality might grant a franchise. The
court's reasoning was that a broad or general act could
not be impliedly repealed by a narrower act. See also
People ex rel Palmer v. National Life, (Illinois) 10 N.E.
2d. 398.
Certainly there was no attempt in 1947 to revise the
entire subject matter of the 1933 act. Chapter 6{a) is
22
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I'

concerned with the creation of "'Speeial improvement,
water supply, sewer and sanitary distriets ... and flood
control districts.·' The 1947 act only provided for systems for water and sewer systems.
Chapter 6(a) authorized the Commission to construct drains, levees and flood barriers in addition to the
facilities necessary for water and sewer systems. The
1947 act did not.
Chapter 6 (a) provided for financing through the
levying of special assessments on the property benefited.
The 1947 act did not.
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947, does not even contain the normal provision that "laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.''
It is respectfully submitted (1) That the legislature
affirmatively indicated that it did not want Chapter
6(a) repealed, when it validated Chapter 6(a) and authorized expressly the County Commission to continue

to proceed under Chapter 6 (a) to issue bonds, etc. ; ( 2)
that Chapter 6 (a) provides for several things not permitted under the 1947 act, thus demonstrating that the
1947 act was not intended to be a complete revision; (3)
that the 1947 act does not even purport by its own language to repeal acts in conflict therewith; ( 4) that there
is no irrepressible conflict in the two acts.

23
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POINT III. CHAPTER 6(a) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 6 (a) on the grounds, first, that it provides for a
special commission assuming municipal functions in
violation of Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution; second, that it vests supervisory control of district functions in the County Commission, which is not
directly responsible only to the people of the district;
and third, that it violates the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. In regard to Article VI,
Section 29, petitioners assume without either discussion
or citation of authority that the words, "municipal function'' used in Section 29, include counties, and in the
teeth of every decision ever handed down by the Utah
Supreme Court on this point, petitioners contend that
this district is a ''special commission.'' Petitioners are
wrong on both points.
Section 29 prohibits the legislature from delegating
to any ''special commission'' the power to interfere
with any municipal improvement or to perform any
"municipal functions". Unless county functions are ineluded in the term "municipal functions", Section 29
will not apply here, because the sewer district does not,
and under Section 1 of the sewer act cannot, include
within its boundaries any city or town. The purpose of
Section 29 is not to declare the sanctity of functions as
such, but to protect the autonomy of cities. The Supreme
Court has on many occasions indicated that it considered

24
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the words "municipal function" to rd\n· only to the
functions of cities and towns. In Logan City r. Pubf.ic
Utilities Commission, 7~ Utnh 536, at 566, ~71 P. 961, the
court said that the purpose of thh~ constitutional proYision is to hold inviolate the right of self-government
to "cities and towns", with respect to municipal improvements and performance of municipal functions.

In Lehi City c. J.lleiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d. 530,
the court held that a metropolitan water district was not
a municipal corporation, and that it was not performing
municipal functions within the contemplation of the Constitution. The court noted various definitions of the word
"municipal". Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion, went into the subject in considerable detail. He
states that a municipal corporation is defined as a corporation created for the purposes of government, or of
or pertaining to a town or city. He then states that:
"Entities which are designed to distribute water,
power, gas, or to dispose of sewage, deal in services, and, incidental to the distribution of service
or of any kind of commodity, there must be
regulation and administration ; but this is not
what we think of as government.''
The question of whether a county's functions as such
were intended to be protected by Article 29 was squarely
raised in the Tygesen v. Magna Water Compa;n.y case
(Utah) 226 P. 2d. 127, and the court indica ted that it had
some doubt that it did, but did not squarely pass upon
the question. See also Union Pacific v. Public Service
Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. 2d. 469.
25
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rrhere is, therefore, considerable doubt that the
wordH "municipal function" as contained in Section 29
'
'
were in any event intended to protect the autonomy of

counties. There is also considerable doubt that the
ownership and operation of a sewer as such is a county's
function. There is not a single county in the State of
Utah, so far as we know, that owns or operates a sewer
plant as a part of the county's function. Sewer systems
and water systems are historically pursuits of cities and
towns, and the right of a city or town to operate a sewer,
water, light, etc. system could logically have been intended as the subject of protection by Section 29.
Counties have not historically performed such functions,
and, therefore, even if the court should hold that
''county functions'' were protected by Section 29, it
should not hold that the operation of a sewer is a county
function in which the county's right of self-government
should be protected.
A more conclusive answer to petitioners' argument
in regard to Article VI Section 29 is that this sewer
district is not a special commission. This question of
special commissions has been before the Supreme Court
in numerous cases. In Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, 226 P. 2d. 127, this question of whether an
improvement district was a special commission was presented to the court. The court refused to determine
whether Section 29 was intended to protect counties,
because it said that the argument was conclusively met
by the fact that the improvement district was not a
special commission. The problem was also presented to
26
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the court in Lehi City v. Jlcilinp, supra, 87 Utah ~~~7,
48 P. 2d. 530. In the J.lle·ilin_q rase, at page ~48, Section
29 was construed. The court said that a metropoli tau
water distrirt is not a sperial rommission within tht>
meaning of Section 29.
The court then went on to say:
"It is contended the act is unconstitutional as an
attempt to unlawfully delegate the power of taxation to a special commission and to interfere in
city and town affairs in violation of the provisions of article 6, section 29.

''This contention cannot be sustained for the
reason that the board of directors to whom the
management and control of the district has been
intrusted, and which is to exercise the powers and
perform the functions of the public agency thus
created, does not come within the designation
'special commission, private corporation or association' to which the inhibitions of the section
apply. Nor does the act provide for interference
with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects. The power of control vested in
the board of directors is over the property, improvements, money and effects of the district, and
not that of any of the cities or towns whose territorial boundaries may be coincidental with that
of the district or included therein. The powers
of the board are limited by the act to the levying
of taxes for the public purposes mentioned therein.''
The same general proposition was set forth in
Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, where the
court noted :

27
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''Assuming, without conceding, that the term
'mu~icipal functions' as used in Art. VI, Sec. 29,
apphes to the functions of counties as well as
cities and towns, nevertheless, plaintiff's contention is not tenable. The management and control
of the Improvement Districts and its properties
and effects are by the Act vested in a Board of
Trustees even though these districts are initiated
by the county commission. Their operations will
be separate and distinct from any of the functions
assumed by the counties in those unincorporated
cities or towns. Although these operations might
be in the same territorial bowndaries as the improvement districts, they will have no control
over the property or effects of the counties or of
the manner of the performance of any of the
functions which the counties have assumed."
We submit that the controlling principle in those
cases was that the district, when created, would not be
administering the funds _of the county, or any city which
might be embraced within the district boundaries. Rather,
the district was administering its own funds, properties,
improvements and effects. That controlling principle is
present in the instant case. The sewer district, which is
created under Chapter 6(a) will not expend the money
of the county, nor will it be controlling, managing or
governing the county's properties, effects or improvements. The portions of the quotes underscored above
show clearly that this is the controlling feature.
Petitioners seek to distinguish those cases on the
grounds that in the instant case the board of county
commissioners becomes also the governing board of the
district, while in the cases cited above the county com28
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missioners were not the office1·s of the distrid cren ted.
This we submit is immaterial. rrhe eases and authorities
to follow will show that this practice of having the governing board of an existing political subdivision become
the governing board of an improvement district is unin~rsally accepted and applied. All of the standard works
and the courts have upheld the practice of having the
members of the county commission become the governing
board of improvement districts.
This practice is not unusual, even to Utah law. For
many years the Supreme Court members also served as
members of the Board of Pardons. The provisions
making the judges of the Supreme Court members of the
Board of Pardons did not convert the Board of Pardons
into the Supreme Court, nor did the Supreme Court
become the Board of Pardons. There were two separate
legal entities. True, both were manned by the same individuals. But, when these individuals were sitting on the
Supreme Court Bench, they functioned as the Supreme
Court of the state. When the same individuals were
sitting on the Board of Pardons, they functioned as the
Board of Pardons, and the identity of the members did
not merge the Board of Pardons and the Supreme Court
into a single organization.
In many of the departments of the state, the same
individuals sit in various separate capacities. The same
persons are the Commissioners of Finance and also the
members of the State Land Board, (See 82(c)-2-12,
U.C.A. 1943). The three members of the engineering
29
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commission are by statute the identical members who
operate the State Road Commission, (82(c)-1-12), the
State Aeronautics Commission ( 4-0-2, U.C.A. 1943) and
the State Building Board, (10-0-1, U.C.A. 1943). It is
thus absolutely contrary to uniform practice to argue
that the district becomes the county and the county is
merged with the sewer district, simply because the governing board of the county and the governing board of
the sewer district is composed of the same individuals.
The cases uniformly uphold our position in this regard.
The rule as stated by the standard works is as follows:
(17 Am. Jur. 794, Drains & Sewers, Section 27)
''The qualifications of officers of an improvement
district and the manner in which they shall be
chosen are matters which rest entirely within the
discretion of the legislature (which) may designate an agency to appoint them or even delegate
the administration of the district affairs to county
or municipal functionaries either in whole or in
part." (And see 28 C.J.S. 254 to the same effect.)
In Nuwn v. Green Company, 161 Iowa 26, 141 N.W.
2d. 716, the officers of a drainage district were, under
the act, to be appointed rather than elected by the
people. The court said that the manner in which the
officers of a drainage district shall be selected rests
entirely with the legislature. Thus, it is not essential to
the validity of a statute allowing the organization of
drainage district that it shall require the officers to be
chosen by the electors of the district.
The power of appointment may be conferred on a
judge, Elliott v. McCrea, 23 Idaho 524, and Patterick v.
30
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Carbon Trater Conscrrancy District, supra, and tht' duty
of administering the affairs of a distrid. may be impost>d
on the incumbent of an ~:.•xisting ot1'iet'. Lamlou'ucrs u.
People, 113 Del. 296 .. Although the Constitution makes
districts legal entities, it is within the legislative discretion to provide that their affairs shall be administered by the existing municipal officers. New Iberia v.
Sew Iberia Drainage District, 106 Louisiana 651, 31
So. 305.

Petitioners· next argument is founded on Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the
political power is inherent in the people. The argument
of petitioners seems to be that because the County Commission is elected by the people of the county as a whole,
rather than merely by the smaller sewer district, the
people have been deprived of the right of free government contrary to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.
This article and section have never been construed so as
to make the governing body of an improvement district
directly responsible only to the people, of that district,
by election ; again petitioners' argument flies right in
the teeth of the existing cases. This article and section
were before the court in Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P. 2d. 503. The court
there upheld the constitutionality of the Water Conservancy Act. Under the Water Conservancy Act, the
governing board is appointed by the district court, rather
than being elected by the people. Thus, the right of the
people to elect a governing board was held not to be
guaranteed by the constitutional provision relied upon.
31
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Further, in a conservancy district it would be a rare
instance in which the people included within a conservancy district were identical with the people voting for
the district judge who appointed the governing board.
In the Patterick case, the conservancy district was only
as broad as Carbon County, whereas, the Seventh Judicial District includes several counties. Further, under
the Water Conservancy Act, counties from different
judicial districts may be included within the same conservancy district. Thus, a conservancy district could
embrace Salt Lake and Davis counties. The proceedings
would be held in only one district court and one district
judge would appoint the governing members. In such
an instance, if the proceedings were initiated in Salt
Lake County, the people of Davis County would not have
a vote, even on the judge who appointed the board members, still the Patterick case said the Water Conservancy
Act is constitutional.
In the M eiling case, supra, Article I, Section 2 was
raised, because the district members were appointed,
rather than elected. Justice Folland said:
''Objection is urged that the members of the
board are not elected by the electors of the district, but are appointed by the governing authorities of the cities or towns as representatives of
such municipalities. "'\Ve, however, find no provision of the Constitution which limits the power
of the Legislature to provide for the governing
or control of such public agencies by officers
selected in the manner provided rather than by
election.''
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Thus, on at least two occasions our Utah Supreme
Court has reviewed the argument now made by petitioners. Petitioners do not cite a single case which
upholds them. Further, their argument is contrary to
the uniform practice in almost every department of
government in the state. The members of the Department
of Agriculture are appointed by the Governor. The department functions only on persons engaged in agricultural pursuits. If we followed petitioners' argument,
the appointive power (the Governor) should, therefore,
be elected only by people engaged in agricultural pursuits or else every function of the agricultural department deprives the people of their right of self-government guaranteed by Article I, Section 2.
We submit that the proper construction of Article I,
Section 2 is to guarantee to the people the right to elect
members of the legislature and to have vested in the
legislature the legislative branch of the government.
The legislature then has the power to carry into effect
all proper legislative functions. Sewage disposal, water
conservancy, flood control, and like improvement districts are problems of general public concern; they have
importance beyond the geographical limits of the particular district. They call for the exercise of legislative
power. The legislature may act directly with reference
to a particular problem or it may delegate that authority
to an administrative agency either elected or appointed.
There is no case nor authority which will uphold the
position of the petitioners, that the governing board of
the district must as a matter of constitutional law be
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directly responsible only to the people within the district.
Their objection was expressly repudiated in both the
Pattcrick and the Meiling cases, and as said by Judge
Folland, the court was unable to find any provision
which limits the power of the legislature "to provide
for the governing or control of such public agencies by
officers selected'' by election rather than by appointment.
(a) Chapter 6(a) Does Not Violate the Due Process
Clauses.
We now come to the argument of petitioners that
Chapter 6 (a) fails to accord to the people of the district
due process of law. In support of this contention petitioners cite four cases, to wit: Argyle v. Johnson, 39
Utah 500, 118 P. 487; Lundberg v. Irrigation District,
40 Utah 83; 119 P. 1309; Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55; and Tygesen v. Mag'IW
Water Company, 226 P. 2d. 127. None of these cases
involves a revenue bond issue. Each of them involves
the power to levy a special assessment, which becomes
a lien on the land by order of the district, or the district
has the general power to levy ad valorem taxes. Due
process of law in regard to districts levying special
assessments or imposing general taxes does require
notice and an opportunity to be heard at some time prior
to the lien becoming effective.
Petitioners recognize that there is a difference between these tax and assessment cases on the one hand
and revenue financing, or special fund cases, on the other.
They argue that this case should fall within the prin34
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ciples laid down in the special assPssment. or tax eases,
rather than under the cases cited by petitioners on page
33 of their brief.
The only reason cited by petitioners in support of
their contention that this revenue bond financing should
not be controlled by the revenue bond cases is that here
some of the people under the application for service
have agreed that their delinquent bill may become a lien
against the property. They say that these people were
coerced into connecting on to the sewer by a criminal
ordinance and they erroneously say the people were
compelled as a condition to connecting on to said system
to give a lien on their property. Thus, say petitioners,
the county is attempting to do indirectly what the law
will not permit the county to do directly. That is, forcing
a lien on the property without notice or an opportunity
to be heard.
The chief basis of the claim of coercion is that there
is an ordinance requiring persons to connect to a sewer
system where available. No authority is cited by petitioners to challenge the legality of this ordinance. The
ordinance was enacted first in 1942, five years prior to
any attempt to create a sewer district. At the time the
ordinance was passed, there were other sewer systems
in the county. There can be no question concerning the
power of the County Commission to pass such an ordinance.
Enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation passed in the legitimate exercise of the police
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"'I

power is not the taking of property without due process
of law.
This question was squarely presented in Hutchinson
v. Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303, 57 L.Ed. 520. The case is
directly in point. There, the city of Valdosta required
all persons residing in the city to connect to a sanitary
sewer. Mrs. Hutchinson claimed that the statute was
unconstitutional, that extreme and arbitrary measures
were used to compel her to connect, without giving her
notice or a hearing, and without bringing condemnation
proceedings to have her premises declared a nuisance to
public health.
The facts showed that the city was an inland town,
built high on a pine ridge, with no swamp nearby. The
city's population did not exceed 5,000-6,000 and covered
an area of two miles. The city passed an ordinance requiring property owners,'' residing upon any street along
which sewer mains had been laid, within thirty days
after the passage of the ordinance, to install water closets
in their houses and connect the same with the main sewer
pipe, and to provide the closets with water, so that they
may be ready for use in the ordinary and usual way, and
such persons shall not be permitted to use or keep on
their premises a surface closet.'' The ordinance goes
on to condemn as a nuisance any house which does not
have a closet and provides that any owner who does
not comply is subject to a fine not exceeding $200.00
or a jail sentence.
36
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"Jirs. Hutchinson had a woodl'll building with "room
sufficient only for her own family." To eomply with the
ordinance she would be compelled to build an nddition
to the house for installation of the bathroom and also
to go to the expense of connecting with the sewer. This,
she alleged, would cost her a considerable sum of money.
The city was threatening to arrest her for non-compliance. The part of the city where she resided was thinly
settled. She alleged that there was no necessity on
account of health or sanitation for her to install a water
closet or to connect with the sewer.
The court said that it was clear that she had had no
notice nor opportunity to be heard before the commencement of the proceedings to force her to connect. She
said that the ordinance ''was passed and the proceedings
against her taken (in violation of) the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, because it provides
neither for notice nor an opportunity to be heard before
the premises are condemned and the owner required to
comply with its provisions.''
The court said :
''The ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. According to the bill the city is given the
power through its mayor and council 'to enact
such rules and regulations for the transaction of
its business and for the welfare and proper government thereof,' as the mayor and council may
deem best; and the bill shows that the courts of
the state decided that the ordinance was within
this delegation of power. It is the commonest
37
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exercise of the police power of a state or city to
provide for a system of sewers, and to compel
property owners to connect therewith. And this
duty may be enforced by criminal penalties. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S.138, 53 L. Ed.
914, 29 S. Ct. Rep. 560. It may be that an arbitrary exercise of the power could be restrained,
but it would have to be palpably so to justify a
court in interfering with so salutary a power and
one so necessary to the public health. There is
certainly nothing in the facts alleged in the bill
to justify the conclusion that the city was induced
by anything in the enactment of the ordinance
other than the public good, or that such was not
its effect."
The rule as thus stated by the United States Supreme
Court is stated to be the general law by 9 Am. Jur. 210,
Buildings, Section 14, where the rule is stated as follows:
"Statutes and ordinances compelling owners of
buildings to install water closets and to connect
their premises with public sewers when not
plainly unreasonable or arbitrary are also within
the police power. An arbitrary exercise of this
power may be restrained, but it must be palpably
so to justify a court in interfering with so salutary a power and one so necessary to the public
health. The fact that it will cost money to comply
with such a law is not a sufficient reason for
declaring it invalid where the expenditures required are reasonable and fair. Nor is it usually
necessary that notice and an opportunity to be
heard be given to a property owner before the
passage of the law, or before an order enforcing
compliance therewith is made.''
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See also New Orleaus Pltblic StTrice Commissiou r.
Se1c Orleans, ~81 U.S. tiS~, 74 L.Ed. 111-l and Atlantic
Coastline Railrod l'. Ooldsboro, ~~~~ U.8. 548.
The ordinance requiring persons to rpa::-;e using
privies, cesspools, etc., is thus a perfectly legitimate
exercise of the police power. It is legislative in nature.
Legislative due process does not require notice or hearing. Utah Power &; Light vs. P.S.C., 107 Utah 155, at
168. This legislative power has been granted to county
commissioners by Section 19-5-36, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, which provides :
''They may make and enforce ... all such local
. . . sanitary regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws.''
And by Section 19-5-49, which provides :
''They may make such provision for the preservation of health in the county . . . as they may
deem necessary and provide for paying the expenses thereof.''
See also Sec. 19-5-80 and 19-5-82 on Health Officers, and
Section 19-5-87 authorizing enactment of enforcement
ordinances.
The distinction which petitioners thus try to make
to take this case out of the general holdings of the
revenue bond cases and place it under the principles of
the assessment cases simply is not sound. No one's constitutional rights were abridged or impaired by the
ordinance requiring a connection. The discussion to
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follow will demonstrate that no one was coerced into
giving a lien on his property, nor is there anything
"palpably" arbitrary or unreasonable about the sewer
ordinances.
The case is controlled by the principles announced
in the so-called special fund cases cited on page 33 by
petitioners, to wit: Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,
279 Pac. 878; Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 144, 28
P. 2d. 144; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 P. 2d. 161; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94
Utah 203, 74 P. 2d. 1191; Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 P. 2d. 61. No notice or hearing is required, because no lien is created by the district.
Any lien which might become effective is a pure matter
of contract, and while the ordinance requiring a connection is coercive, five separate application contracts were
available-four of which had no lien agreement. Even
the one which agreed that the bill might become a lien
did not place a lien on the property. The lien became
effective only when the bill was 90 days or more delinquent and could not be recorded as such until six months
delinquent. Of course, no one would contend that a lien
can not be created by contract.
In the case of Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City,
94 Utah 203, 74 P. 2. 1191, the court said on page 216
that where the power is given to a city to issue revenue
bonds and no method of executing it are linked with the
·grant of power ''any reasonable means which will effectuate that purpose is lawful.'' The court also noted on
40
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page ~25 that it was of the opinion that in tlw ah~etwt~
of a legislatiYe requirement that a reYennf• bond be
submitted to a vote of the people, that the eity did not
have to do so. All of these special funds cases involving
Article XIV, Section 3, presented the question of whether
a revenue bond created "a debt". Having held that it
did not, the necessary conclusion then had to be drawn
that it did not have to be submitted to a vote of the
people.
In the instant case, Section 1 of the act expressly
authorized the district to acquire systems and to pay
for the same from tolls and charges or from assessments,
or both. Section 8 authorized the district to issue bonds.
Section 8 authorized the district to fix rules and regulations for the use of the facility. Nowhere is there a
requirement that the matter be submitted to the people
for a vote of approval. Because in the sale of revenue
bonds, the district does not pledge the private property
in the district nor obligate itself to assess or tax the
property of the district, nor create a burden on the
property in the district, it is not taking property, and
the due process clauses simply do not apply.
In the Utah Power &; Light Compa;ny case, cited
above, the matter had been submitted to a vote of the
people, although the court held that such would not have
been necessary, because the bonds involved were revenue
bonds. Here the County Commission did go to the people
with the plan, even though such would not have been
necessary. In a special election, it is notorious that only
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a very small percentage of the people express themselves.
The percentage is often lower than 10 per cent. In the
manner adopted by the County Commission here, we
have heard from nearly 100 per cent of the people, either
in the form of a protest or an application for service,
and over 75 per cent of all the people affected have
applied for service without protest. Like in the Utah
Power & Light case, this consultation with the people
would not have been necessary under any constitutional
requirements, but the consultation with the people does
not change the legal effect of the proceedings, nor does
it cut down the legal power of the Commission. Such
was the square holding of the Utah Power & Light case.
J.VIixed up with the argument on due process are
conglomerate assertions and suggestions that the sewer
plan itself throws an oppressive burden upon the people.
Of course, the Hutchinson v. Valdosta case, supra, which
expressly holds that an ordinance compelling people to
connect to a sewer is _constitutional, places one limitation
on its holding. If the requirement is palpably oppressive
and highly unreasonable and in cost so high as to be
confiscatory, then requiring a connection might be restrained. Petitioners neither allege nor argue that the
plan is so palpably oppressive as to be confiscatory, but.
they do hint that it places an unfair burden on the initial
subscriber. The basis of the Supreme Court holding that
enforcement could be restrained would not rest upon the
failure to hold hearings prior to the enactment. Legislative enactments do not require notice and hearing. Utah
Power & Light v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah
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150. The ba~is of its unconstitutionality wouhl lH' that
because it was so oppressiYt', people could not l'l'a~c..mably
comply and it would amount to a confiscation of property
without compensation. It was upon this basis that utility
rates fixed by public regulation were sometimes declared
to be unconstitutional. Rate-making, of course, was
legislative, and the manner of fixing rates being legislative, could not be held to lack the essentials of procedural due process. Utah Power & Light u. Pttblic Service Comnzissioll, supra, 107 Utah 155, 168. But if the
final result of the rate was so high as to be confiscatory,
then it would amount to a taking of property without
compensation.
Petitioners have not contended that the down payment and monthly service fee are so high as to confiscate
the people's property and render the statute unconstitutional. As noted above in the Statement of Facts, the
contract forms (which are attached to the County's
answer) permit any individual to connect to the sewer
for a $50.00 down payment, $10.00 a month for an additional ten months and $3.00 a month when service is commenced. The ordinance even permits the individual to
finance the cost of building the line from the street to
his house. If he desired, the district would build this
line, and he could pay the cost of building that line at
the rate of $10.00 a month. Therefore, any individual
could connect to the sewer, have the line completed to
his house and could receive service with a down payment
of only $50.00. The $10.00 per month payment would
run either for ten months, if he built his own line, or
43
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about 25 months if the district built his house line.
Thereafter, the charge was $3.00 per month.
As noted above, there was no requirement that he
give a lien to secure payment of his bill. Even on the
time basis outlined above, he could post $54.00 (18
months' service charge) and there was no agreement to
give a lien. He could pay $750.00 for the privilege of
hooking on to the sewer and would never thereafter be
required to pay anything toward the sewer's cost. He
had the assurance that if others who paid on a time
basis finally paid less than this $750.00, the difference
would be refunded to him. He could finance the $750.00
from private sources. He could finance it with the district
in 24 equal monthly payments. He could start out on
one of the time bases mentioned and later decide to pay
the entire $750.00. Even the contract to give a lien did
not create a present lien. The lien became effective only
if he failed to pay his bill, and permitted it to remain in
default 90 days or more.
In relief cases, an arrangement was made for payment of the connection fee and monthly service charge
by the Department of Public Welfare. The $750.00 total
cost for a sewer system and a treatment plant is, as the
petitioners well know, well within the limits of such costs
throughout the nation. It is, therefore, easy to understand why they have not contended by an analysis of
the facts that the ordinance of 1942, which required
persons to connect to a sewer system was so oppressive
as to confiscate property. It is, therefore, respectfully
44
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submitted that there was nothing unconstitutional in
requiring the people to discontinue privies, cesspools,
and septic tanks in the concentrated areas of Salt Lake
County, and the authorities cited above conclusively uphold the legislative power of the county to so provide.
The basis of payment was such that no person could
justifiably claim that the cost of complying with the
ordinance was so burdensome as to be confiscatory and,
therefore, unconstitutional.

and
and
this
five

On page 37 of the brief they complain of five things
then say that nothing could be more unreasonable
oppressive than this. In conclusion, therefore, on
due process point, we desire to give attention to the
matters raised on page 37 of petitioners' brief.

They first complain because they had no voice in the
creating of a district. The cases cited above under the
discussion of the effect of the legislative validation hold
that the legislature could by legislative fiat create a
district and fix its boundaries. They also hold that the
legislature may delegate the right to create a district
and that it is only when the district attempts to impose
a tax or a lien against the property by way of a special
assessment, that a hearing is required. In this case,
the creation of the district was ratified and confirmed
by the legislature, which would have had the power in
the first instance to create it without notice or hearing,
and the failure on the part of the residents to have a
larger voice in the creation of the district has not deprived them of any constitutional right. The County
45
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Commission, to whom the petition for creation of the
district was presented, was duly elected by the people
of the County, and Section 1 gave the County Commission discretion as to whether it would create a district,
even if the requisite number of people petitioned for its
creation. In all respects the statutes were followed in
the creation of the district. If there were any irregularities (and none is pointed out by petitioners), those
irregularities were cured by legislative validation. As
to the right to have a voice in the creation of the district
see, in addition to the cases cited under Point I, Seliah
v. Hoskins, 222 U.S. 522; Little River Drainage, 236 Mo.
94, 139 s.w. 330.
The
criminal
sewer, is
Supreme

second complaint, to wit, that there was a
ordinance which required connection to the
adequately met by the square holding of the
Court in Hutchinson v. Valdosta, supra.

The third complaint that applicants were required
to put a lien on their house or keep an eighteen months'
advance deposit, is founded upon a mis-statement of fact.
There were five, not two, methods of applying for service.
Only one of the five provided for a lien if the bill became
90 days delinquent. The lien was a matter of contract
and did not involve the concept of due process. All of
this has been set forth in detail above, and will not be
repeated here.
The fourth protest is that there was a $100.00 increase in the connection fee for persons who did not
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sign for 8t'rYice by a 8tated deadline. The $100.00 increase, about which they so bitterly complain, was
adopted for the purpose of protecting those who sign
up for service at the beginning. If they are not given
any protection, any individual with a vacant lot could
refuse to make any contribution toward the initial cost
of the sewer until some future date, when he elected to
build a house. If at that time he could connect on to the
system at exactly the same connection fee as was paid
by the initial subscriber, he would receive the benefits
of a system partially paid for by others. A subscriber
initially connecting to the system would pay $150.00
down and $3.00 a month for twenty years, before the
system was paid for. A subscriber connecting ten years
from now, if permitted to do so, would pay the same
$150..00 down, but would pay the $3.00 per month for
only ten years. To avoid this the County Commission
declared that it would periodically increase the amount
of the connection charge, so that any individual coming
in at a future date would be required to pay his share
of the total cost. An initial subscriber would pay $150.00
down and $3.00 a month for twenty years. Fifty cents
of this $3.00 would be necessary for operation and main·
tenance. The other $2.50 would go to pay the interest
and principal on the bonds. Thus, during that twenty
years this individual would pay on the bonds an additional $600.00, which together with his down payment
would make the cost of the sewer to him $750.00. A
person coming in ten years later would pay only for ten
years and thus would pay only $300.00 on the bonds at
47
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the $3.00 monthly payments. If his down payment were
also fixed at $150.00, he would get the sewer for $450.00,
instead of the $750.00 paid by the initial subscriber. By
raising his connection fee, he can be required to carry
his fair share. There is nothing arbitrary or capricious
in such a plan, and Section 9 of the act expressly gives
the district the power to fix tolls and charges and provide
rules and regulations.
The complaint then is made that the $100.00 increase
coming at such an early date goes beyond what is necessary to equalize the payments. This is true, but any
individual who expects to build a house in the next two
or three years will be induced to subscribe for service
now if he can get it for $150.00 rather than wait two
or three years if he knows that at that time the down
payment will be $250.00. Thus, by having a substantial
early increase in the amount of the connection fee, prospective builders will be induced to sign for service now.
The $100.00 increase has in fact had that effect, because
over 1200 vacant lots have applied for service. This
spreads the initial cost of the sewer over more people
and reduces the total amount which ultimately will have
to be paid by the initial subscribers.
Tied to the complaint on the $100.00 increase is the
assertion that early subscribers are required to build
and pay for a system large enough to meet future growth.
This again is a misstatement of the plan. As the new
connections come in, they will, as noted above, carry
their portion of the sewer cost, from an increased con48
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nection fee. Payments made by them will be used to
pay the bonds off before maturity. Also, in anticipation
of growth in the area, more bonds were made payable
in the later years. The initial subscribers will pay off
only a small portion ·of the bonds. Reference to Exhibit
V, page 11, will show that only $25,000.00 in the bonds
will become due in 1955 and 1956; $50,000.00 per year
from 1957 to 1979; $100,000.00 a year from 1980 to 1981;
$150,000.00 per year from 1982 to 1986 ; and $600,000.00
the last year, 1987. This staggering of the bond rna turities was done for the sole purpose of freeing the initial
subscriber from carrying the entire cost of a sewer
system which was built large enough to meet the needs
of an expanding population.
Thus, the contention by petitioners that the initial
subscribers are having to pay a disproportionate share
of total costs is simply not true. The $100.00 increase
has a legitimate and proper purpose in the bond proceedings. It does have the effect of inducing people to
sign for service and start carrying their burden of the
cost from the beginning, but if they elect to wait, they
then will pay their fair share of total cost. Petitioners
are inconsistent in complaining about the $100.00 increase, while in the same breath complaining that vacant
lot owners are not being brought in and early users are
being required to pay a disproportionate share of the
costs. Those connecting in subsequent years will be required to pay their fair share of the total cost. The
increased connection fee will be used to pay the bonds
ahead of maturity and relieve the burden from the initial
49
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subscriber. The maturing dates set on the bonds throw
the major portion of the cost on ''tail end'' when the
expanded population is connected to the system.
The last thing complained about on page 37 is that
if the bills aren't paid, the culinary water will be shut
off. The sewer district does not own nor control the
water supply going to the residents of the sewer district.
The most it can do is request cooperation of a water
company in this regard; and this request could hardly
render the proceedings void.
The Commission Has Not Unlawfully Permitted the
District to Exceed Its Debt Limit.
Every case which has been presented to the Supreme
Court in the entire history of the state on the question
of debt limits for districts of this kind has resulted in a
decision that these districts are not subject to the constitutional debt limits. No case to the contrary is cited
by petitioners. The cases holding that districts of this
kind are not controlled by Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4
of the Constitution are Lehi v. Meiling, supra; Tygesen
v. Magna Water Company, supra, and Patterick v. Car-bon Water Conservancy District, supra.
The cases also all hold that the debt limits do not in
any event apply to revenue bond financing, because a
debt which is payable entirely from the revenues of a
new project is not a debt within the meaning of the
section, even if this district were a political subdivision
within the meaning of that provision. The argument as ta
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the applicability of Section 19-10-1 falls in the same
category. Petitioners' assertion that there is no substantial difference between revenue and assessment
financing simply ignores the great body of law on that
question.
This court has on numerous occasions held that
where projects are financed solely from revenues earned
by the project, there is no necessity for an election on
the bond issue, (Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City,
supra), the indebtedness incurred is not a debt within
the limitation of the constitutional prohibitions, and the
requirements of due process as to notice and hearing
which are required in assessment or tax cases do not
apply.

POINT IV: CHAPTER 6(a) IS NOT SO VAGUE,
INDEFINITE, AMBIGUOUS, OR UNCERTAIN
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS NO'r
DETERMINABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE
THE VALIDATION ACT CONFIRMS THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WORDS
NOW CLAIMED TO BE CONFUSING.
Petitioners contend Chapter 6(a) is so vague as to
violate the Utah Constitution, Article V. No authority
need be cited, certainly, for the general proposition that
the Supreme Court must, where possible, uphold the
validity of an act, rather than declare it unconstitutional.
With specific reference to the objection of vagueness,
this Court has said, in Tygesen v. Magn.a Water Company, supra:
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''It is the duty of courts to interpret and construe
statutes, and only where the statute is so vague
that the meaning of the legislature cannot be
ascertained or understood therefrom will they
refuse to enforce an act. They will not substitute
what they think ought to be the law -for ambiguous terms in the act, nor will they declare an Act
invalid because it has not been expressed as aptly
or clearly as it could have been had different terms
been used. Instead the courts will use every
authorized means to discover and give an Act
intelligible meaning. Only when it is impossible
to resolve the doubts will an Act be declared
invalid for uncertainty or vagueness. See Nowers
v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 Pac. 2d. 108."
Plaintiff points to two terms of the act as uncertain,
ambiguous or vague. The :first is the word ''people'' in
the phrase '' 10% of the people must petition for the
improvement" in Chapter 6(a), Section 1. Perhaps the
exact legislative intent would be difficult to determine
if no extra-statutory assistance were available, but such
assistance is available. A petition was :filed with the
commission, and its signatures were accepted by the
commission on a definite criterion, according to the
plaintiff (page 45 of brief). The legislature then validated the proceedings by which the district had been
established. It thereby confirmed as the legislative intent
the administrative interpretation placed upon the inculpated phrase.
Petitioners next aver that they are not sure what
is meant by "appropriate and possible under the

law~

of the United States" in Section 8 of Chapter 6(a). Peti
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tioners' first point was that the phrase could only refer
to a particular federal act. \Ve do not agree that Section
8 attempts to limit the district only to negotiations as
provided by any federal act, but we admit having been
swayed by petitioners' argument that part thereof quoted
was inserted to call attention to a way of financing
projects provided by a particular federal act. Even if
the phrase is entirely ignored, however, the act is complete and workable.
At any rate, by using "every authorized and intelligible means to discover and give (this) act intelligible
meaning", it can easily be judicially interpreted without
fear of offending the Utah Constitution. No other item
as to vagueness is raised by petitioners.
POINT V: CHAPTER 23(b) LAWS OF UTAH, 1947,
IS NOT REPUGNANT TO ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, OR ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Petitioners' objection is that Chapter 6(a), Title 19,
authorized the creation of many kinds of districts, but
that Chapter 23(b) purported to cure defects in the organization of sewer districts only. Petitioners say
Chapter 23(b) is, therefore, a special law, or that it
creates a corporation for municipal purposes.
Article VI, Section 26, prohibits the legislature from
enacting any special laws in certain enumerated cases
only. Petitioners apparently believe subsection 16, which
prohibits special laws, "Granting to an individual, asso53
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ciation or corporation any privilege, immunity or franchise,'' applies to the facts in this case. We submit that
the Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District is not an
individual, association or corporation. It is a political
subdivision (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy

District, supra). Nor did Chapter 23(b) grant any franchise, immunity or privilege. Even if it were true that
Chapter 23(b) is a "special law" (which it is not) therefore, petitioners have not cited a constitutional prohibition which applies. There is no constitutional provision
which prohibits the validation by a special law of proceedings under a general law.
But Chapter 23(b) is not a special law. It is a statute
general in terms purporting to validate the proceedings
of any sewer district attempted to be created under
Chapter 6 (a), Title 19. Petitioners say that the Salt
Lake City Suburban Sewer District was the only one
affected "as far as we know". An act general in terms
is presumed to be general (Kennedy v. Meyer, 103 A. 44).
The mere fact that only one entity is affected by a curative act is of no moment. Kennedy v. Meyer, supra, involved a curative act validating any contract for the
construction of a tunnel which any county had entered
into. Only one county had entered into a contract for
the construction of a tunnel. The court held the statute
was a general statute. In McSurely v. McGrew, 18 N.W.
415, the legalization of the acts of county supervisors in
releasing the county treasurer from liability for loss
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of funds deposited in a bank which failed was upheld.
Only one treasurer was affected.
The plain fact is, of course, that curative acts are
not the evil the Constitutional Convention attacked in
adopting the provision cited by petitioners. Remedial
statutes are and long have been recognized legislative
tools. To some extent, they are similar to special acts,
in that they can only affect particular, existing persons,
obligations or entities, and the exact ones affected can
always be determined at the time the curative act is
passed. But it is often stated flatly that such laws are
not special. (Barnett v. State Mineral Board, 192 So. 701
and cases previously cited.) If such acts had been abhorrent to the convention, they could have been prohibited by name.
So far as Article XI, Section 5, is concerned, it does
not purport to apply to improvement districts, and it has
been held by this Court not to apply to improvement
districts. (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservarn.cy District, supra.)
In the Sixth Edition of Cooley's Treatis on the
Constitutional Limitations, the question of remedial or
retrospective laws is dealt with, and we quote the following from page 455 of Chapter 11 of that work:
''There is no doubt of the right of the legislature
to pass statutes which reach back to change or
modify the effect of prior transactions provided
retrospective laws are not forbidden eo nomine
by the state constitution."
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A typical case in which the principle has been recognized
is Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 198 A. 746, 116
A.L.R. 1031, wherein as shown by the syllabus, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut said:
"Remedial statutes may be retrospective in operation provided they do not impair contracts or
disturb absolute vested rights, but only to confirm rights already existing and in furtherance
of the remedy, and by curing defects afford or
add to the means of enforcing existing rights or
obligations; and if the irregularity sought to be
cured consists in a mode or manner of doing
some act which the legislature might have made
immaterial by prior law, it is equally competent
to make the same immaterial by a subsequent

law.''
Petitioners cite no cases in support of the notion
that a validating act must validate all proceedings which
have been attempted under a prior law if it is to validate
any of them. They state no reason for such a restriction
on legislative activity. There is none.
POINT VI: THE EFFECT OF THE REPEALING
RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 6, 1952, WAS AT
LEAST TO RESTORE THE LAW AS IT WAS
BEFORE THE ORDINANCE REPEALED BY
THAT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED.
McQuillan, 3rd Edition, Section 21.42, cites cases
from nine jurisdictions, including the United States
(U. 8. v. Philbrook, 120 U.S. 52) in support of the following statement:
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''A rule, supported by many cases and probably
the common law rule, is that the repeal of a repealing statute or ordinance restores the law,
without formal words of reYiYal, as it was before
the repealing statute or ordinance, unless it is
otherwise provided in the enactment repealing
the repealing statute or ordinance.''
There are no statutory or constitutional restrictions
on the power so to revive a once existing legal situation.
The resolution of October 6, 1952, clearly states the intent
of the Commissioners to revive the legal situation which
obtained before the resolution of April 5, 1948. The
procedure by which repeal of the repealer was attempted
(resolution) was of the same magnitude as the procedure
(resolution) repealed and rescinded. The only possible
conclusion under the cases is that the status of the Salt
Lake City Suburban Sanitary District proceedings have
been, at least since October 6, 1952, exactly what it was
on April 4, 1948.
The proceedings in connection with the sewer between April 5, 1948, and October 6, 1952, do not depend
on any ordinance or resolution. The district, (which was
an existing political entity) was not repealed by the
resolution of April 5, 1948. It had express power to
enter into contracts, as it did with an engineer, a fiscal
agent and people in the district. That is all the district
did. So far as the many hearings held and informative
pamphlets distributed are concerned, they were just as
informative and just as well attended and received as
if the resolution of April 5, 1948, had never been passed.
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W s submit that the only sensible way for district
officers to operate is as the officers of the Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary ,bistrict have in this case.
1. A district is established, the object· of which is
the installation of a sewer facility. This was done September 9, 1946, and no attempt has ever been made to
dissolve, abandon or rescind this action.

2. The governing authority contracted with an
engineer to determine cost and feasibility.
3. The governing authority contracted with a fiscal
agent to devise the best and least burdensome way to
finance the project.
4. With a workable plan, they now go to the people;
they schedule mass meetings, distribute pamphlets and
explain a proposed plan.
5. They ask the people to indicate their approval
of the plan by their willingness by contract to subscribe
for the services and pay for them as proposed.
6. Now the governing authority can intelligently
construct an ordinance with reference to a bond issue,
knowing the project is feasible, how much it will cost
and how many people can be relied upon initially to
contribute to the revenues which are the pledge supporting the bonds.
The procedure was orderly and in the best legislative
tradition, get the facts as accurately and completely as
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possible, and then act on them. Statutes may require
that the fact-finding process be one of hearing, protest,
etc., but they needn't, and Chapter 6 (a) doesn't.
Petitioners contend the contractual provisions of the
subscription applications would not be effective unless
the Commission formally approved them. Such action
is necessary and the Commission can and will approve
and accept these agreements. Petitioners suggest that
some kind of formal action is necessary to indicate that
a district intends to contract; that it has seen and understands the provisions of a particular contract; that it
is now entering into a contract, and that a contract
entered into is now approved. This is just so much
palover. The people have applied for service. The
district will formally accept.
We do not contend that Chapter 23(b), Laws of
Utah, 1947, the curative act, has prospective effect. It is,
however, legislative confirmation of the creation of the
district and the initial bond proceedings. It also is a
confirmation by the legislature of the administrative
interpretation previously given Chapter 6(a), Title 19,
by the Commission. So far as subsequent acts of the
Commission with reference to the district have been
consistent with that interpretation, therefore, they have
statutory authorization invigorated by Chapter 23(b).
Defendants do not rely on the validating act for authority to make the amendments which petitioners detail on
page 60 of their brief; they rely on Chapter 6 (a), Title
19, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
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Particular attention is directed to the argument
appearing in capital letters on page 62 of petitioners'
brief. It is that the district officers can possibly do something illegal in the future. The usual rule is that a court
will not consider such an argument, and that there will
be time enough to enjoin or restrain such an act if, as
and when it happens. In Wicks v. Salt Lake City, 208
Pac. 538, this Court responded to such an argument :
"Plaintiff does not contend that it manifestly
appears that the act of 1921 attempts to authorize
the creation of a debt in excess of the limit fixed
by the Constitution, but the contention seems to
be that there is a vague and remote possibility
that a literal compliance with the law may at
some time result in the creation of (such indebtedness.
''To hold (an act) unconstitutional on some vague
theory that in its operation there is the barest
possibility of an infringement of the Constitution
is going further than any case which has heretofore come under my observation.''
See also the discussion by Mr. Justice Wolfe in
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, supra,
on the time set for the hearing.
It is respectfully submitted that the plan is legal
and reasonable and the writ of prohibition should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
FRANK E. MOSS
Attorneys for Defendants
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